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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: THE UMITS OF THE
PREVENTIVE STATE
CAROL S.  STEIKER
I.  PUNISHMENT VS.  PREVENTION
Our federal  Constitution  has a lot to say  about crime  and
punishment.  Even in the "structural" part of the Constitution,
which is not often  thought to be the source of much criminal
regulation,  references  to criminal  law and criminal  procedure
abound.  For example, the drafters took care to enumerate the
crimes  for which federal  officials  are  subject to  impeachment
and removal from office'  and for which federal law-makers  are
exempt from arrest during  Congressional  sessions.2  And they
specifically provided for Congress'  power to punish the crimes
of counterfeiting,3 treason,4 piracy,5 and violations of "the Law of
Nations., 6  Moreover,  entire  species  of penal  laws-bills  of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws-are placed by the Constitution
. Professor of Law, Harvard  Law School.  I thank Marty Lederman, Jordan  Steiker
and participants in the Harvard  Law School Summer Research Program for helpful
comments and discussions.
'See  U.S.  CoNsT. art. H,  §  4 (stating that federal  officials may be impeached  and
removed  from office  for the crimes of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors").
2  See id. at art. I, § 6,  cI.  1 (stating that Senators and Representatives are privileged
from arrest during law-making sessions  for all  crimes  "except Treason,  Felony and
Breach of the Peace").
'See  id.  at art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
See id. at art. IlI, § 3,  cl. 2.
See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
6  See id.CAROL S. STE1KER
outside  of the reach of both state and federal legislators.  And
certain  procedures are required not only for treason  trials,8 but
also  for criminal  trials  more  generally-in  particular,  trial  by
jury 9 and the  availability of the writ of habeas  corpus in peace-
time.' °
The  Bill of Rights more  famously and in more detail  occu-
pies  itself with  both  substantive  and  procedural  criminal  law.
The Eighth Amendment's  proscription of "excessive  bail,"  "ex-
cessive  fines,"  and  "cruel  and unusual punishments"  has been
interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  limit both  federal  and
state  officials  in their  legislative  and judicial  capacities.  The
Fifth Amendment's  repudiation of double jeopardy can also be
read  as a substantive  limit on the  government's  power to pun-
ish. 1 2 Moreover, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments speak directly
and  in  significant  detail  about  the  procedures  necessary  in
"criminal  case [s]" 13  and  "criminal  prosecutions, '4  requiring,
among  other  things,  grand jury  indictments,"  the  privilege
against  self-incrimination,  speedy  trials,  impartial juries,  con-
frontation  of witnesses  by the accused,  compulsory process for
the accused, and the assistance  of counsel for the defense.  And
the  "due process"  clause  of the Fifth and Fourteenth  Amend-
ments has been held to require even more in the way of proce-
See id. at art. I,  §  10, cl. 1 (state legislators);  itL  at art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Congress).
See id. at art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
'See  id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
'0  See id. at art. I, § 9,  cl. 2.
" See id.  at amend. VIII;  Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365  (1971)  (stating that the
"excessive  bail" clause  "has been assumed"  to apply  to the states);  Robinson  v. Cali-
fornia,  370  U.S.  660,  666-67  (1962)  (applying the Eighth Amendment's  "cruel and
unusual" punishment clause to a state statute).  While the Supreme Court has not yet
had  occasion  to  rule that the  "excessive  fines" clause  likewise  applies  to the states,
agreement "appears universal" that the Court will do so.  See NancyJ. King, Portioning
Punishment: Constitutional  Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
101,  155 n.155  (1995)  (citing sources).
12 See generally King, supra note 11,  at 104-05 (arguing for such an interpretation of
the  Double Jeopardy  Clause  in  conjunction  with  the  Due Process  Clause  and  the
Eighth Amendment).
"U.S.  CoNsT. amend. V.
Id. at amend. VI.
But only for federal prosecutions.  See Hurtado v. California,  110 U.S. 516 (1884)
(refusing to apply the grand jury clause to state prosecutions).
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dural  protections  in criminal  cases,  most notably  the  require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable  doubt for conviction. 16  Fi-
nally,  the  Fourth  Amendment's  prohibition  of "unreasonable
searches and seizures," while not on its face limited to criminal
cases, has been  elucidated  extensively-indeed,  virtually exclu-
sively-in  the  realm  of the  regulation  of  police  practices  in
criminal cases.
The  Supreme  Court,  the  lower  federal  courts,  and  state
courts of all levels  have  elaborated extensively  on the meaning
of most of these  constitutional  proscriptions  and requirements
in the thirty-plus years since the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure  "revolution," when  most of the provisions  of the  Bill  of
Rights  relating  to  criminal  investigation  and prosecution  were
made  applicable  to the states.'8  As  a result, the constitutional
regulation of the criminal process has become its own legal sub-
specialty, with its own courses, casebooks, treatises, and experts.
It is  taken for granted, both  in the  legal  academy  and in the
wider  world  of legal institutions,  that the constitutional  prob-
lems posed by  the creation  and enforcement  of criminal  laws
are  distinct and distinctively  important.  To  coin a phrase, the
limits of "the punitive state"'9 have been explored extensively  (if
not resolved  successfully)  both by courts  and legal  commenta-
tors.
6  See U.S.  CONsT.  amend. V;  id. at amend. XIV; In re Winship,  397 U.S. 358,  364
(1970).
7This focus  is largely due to.the incorporation  of the exclusionary rule, see Mapp
v.  Ohio, 367 U.S. 643  (1961),  which has created an incentive for Fourth Amendment
litigation by criminal defendants in every plausible  case.  Moreover, as Bill Stuntz has
noted, the conceptual  focus on privacy as the Fourth Amendment's  central organiz-
ing value has proven to have limited bite in non-criminal  cases, given the inescapable
rise of the regulatory state since the New Deal.  See William J.  Stuntz, Privacy's  Problem
and the Law of Criminal  Procedure,  93 MICH. L. REV. 1016,  1018-19  (1995).
,"  See generally Carol S.  Steiker,  Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Proce-
dure? Two  Audiences,  Two  Answers, 94  MICH.  L.  REv.  2466  (1996)  (describing  and
evaluating  the evolution of constitutional  criminal procedure from the 1960s to the
1990s).
" It might not be obvious in this context that by "state" I mean not one of the fifty
states in our federal system,  but more generally any sovereign  governmental  power.
See WEBSTER'S  NINTH  NEW COLiEGIATE  DIGnIONARY  1151  (1990)  (contrasting "a politi-
cally organized body of people ...  ; esp.: one that is sovereign" with "one of the con-
stituent units of a nation having a federal government").
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In contrast, courts and commentators have had much less to
say about the related  topic of the limits of the state not as pun-
isher  (and  thus,  necessarily  as  investigator  and  adjudicator  of
criminal  acts)  but  rather  as  preventer  of crime  and  disorder
generally.  Indeed, courts and commentators have not yet even
recognized  this  topic  as a distinct  phenomenon  either  doctri-
nally or conceptually.  Of course, one way to prevent crime is to
punish criminals,  thereby incapacitating  (and perhaps  even re-
habilitating) them during the period of their incarceration,  de-
terring  the  specific  individuals  involved  from  further
criminality, and deterring others by example.  But punishment
is not the  only, the most common, or the most effective  means
of crime prevention.  The state can also attempt to identify and
neutralize dangerous  individuals before  they commit crimes  by
restricting  their  liberty  in  a variety  of ways.  In  pursuing  this
goal, the state often will expand the functions of the institutions
primarily  involved  in the  criminal justice system-namely,  the
police  and the  prison.  But other  analogous  institutions,  such
the juvenile justice  system 2 0  and the  civil  commitment process,
are  also  sometimes  tools  of, to coin  another  phrase, the  "pre-
ventive state."
The preventive  state is all the rage these days, and it can be
seen in many different guises.  One set of prophylactic measures
involves  giving the police  more authority to intervene earlier to
prevent,  as  opposed  to  merely  detect  and  investigate,  crime.
For example,  "community policing" initiatives are sweeping the
country's  urban  police departments,  and one  thing that  these
often divergent policies seem to have in common  is enhancing
the preventive  role of police  officers.2'  Localities are also seek-
ing to  give  the police broader preventive  authority by enacting
20  A typical juvenile justice system consists of at least three different sorts of state
intervention:  intervention to deal with children who are abused or neglected by their
parents  or guardians;  intervention  to deal with children  who are at risk  because of
behaviors  like truancy  or running away  (in which  case the children  are deemed "in
need of supervision" or "in need of services");  and intervention to deal with children
who  have  committed delinquent  acts  (acts which  would  be  crimes  if committed  by
adults).  See,  e.g., MASS.  ANN. LAWS ch. 119,  §§ 21,  39E, 51B, 52, 58 (1998).
2  See Debra  Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing,  97 CoLUM. L. Rav. 551, 576 (1997).
[Vol.  881998] THE PREVENTIVE STATE
new substantive offenses such as "drug loitering" or "gang loiter-
ing.  The  federal  government  has  enhanced federal  law  en-
forcement's  preventive  power  by  reviving  and  expanding  the
practice  of civil forfeiture  based only upon "probable  cause. 23
And  the  Supreme  Court has  authorized  several  important  as-
pects of preventive policing under the Fourth Amendment.  For
example, the Court has extended its holding that a limited Terry
"stop-and-frisk" of a person is justified without probable cause in
order  to  prevent  harm  to  police  officers  to  legitimize  similar
prophylactic "frisks" of cars24 and even houses.2"  And the Court
has added  significantly to  the  (formerly) short list of searches
and seizures that may be done without any individualized suspi-
cion whatsoever.26
Another  set  of prophylactic  measures  involves  direct  re-
straints by legislatures  on the liberty of certain individuals  be-
lieved  to  be  particularly  dangerous.  For  example,  pre-trial
preventive  detention  of both juveniles  and adults  has become
much more common in recent years.27  Many states are seeking
2  See, e.g.,  Chicago v. Morales,  687 N.E.2d  53  (Ill.  1997),  cert. granted,  66 U.S.L.W.
3686  (U.S. Apr. 21,  1998)  (No. 97-1121)  (granting certiorari  to decide  the constitu-
tionality  of a municipal  ordinance  permitting  the police  to order groups  in public
places  to disband if the police  officer reasonable believes that the group contains at
least one gang member); City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138,  148 (Ohio 1993)
(striking down  a  municipal  ordinance  prohibiting  loitering "under circumstances
manifesting  the  purpose  to  engage  in  drug-related  activity"  as  unconstitutionally
vague).
See generally Mary M. Cheh,  Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable  Also Be
Fair?: Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the  Constitution, 39  N.Y.L.  SCR.  L.  REV.  1
(1994)  (describing and critiquing the recent explosion in both federal and state civil
forfeiture law).
2' See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.  1032  (1983) (extending  Teny frisk to passenger
compartment of automobile).
'  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)  (approving limited protective sweep of
house).
'  See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646  (1995)  (permitting suspi-
cionless drug testing of high school athletes); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S.  444  (1990)  (permitting suspicionless  stopping and questioning of motorists at
sobriety  checkpoints);  Skinner  v.  Railway  Labor  Executives'  Ass'n,  489  U.S.  602
(1989)  (permitting suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of certain railroad employ-
ees).
2  See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481  U.S.  739  (1987)  (upholding the preventive
detention  provisions  of the federal Bail  Reform Act of 1984);  Schall v. Martin,  467
U.S. 253  (1984) (upholding the preventive detention provisions of the New York Fam-
ily Court Act).CAROL S. STEIKER
to prevent sexual assaults, particularly those against children, by
enacting  sex  offender registration  and/or community notifica-
don  statutes"'  and  by  creating  or  reviving  "sexually  violent
predator" statutes  that permit  the indefinite  civil  commitment
of convicted sex  offenders who would  otherwise  be released  at
the end of their prison terms.2
This diverse set of preventive  practices and policies has cre-
ated  (or at  least  exacerbated)  two  important  legal  problems,
one  of which  is beginning to get a lot of attention,  and one  of
which  is  hardly  recognized  at all.  The problem  currently  at-
tracting attention is the problem of identifying those preventive
practices and policies that are "really" criminal punishment and
thus subject to the range of constitutional constraints, both sub-
stantive  and  procedural,  that  delimit  the  use  of the  criminal
sanction.  For  example,  must  the  civil  forfeiture  of property
used or acquired in the course of criminal behavior be "propor-
tionate" in the way in which criminal punishment must be un-
der the  Eighth  Amendment?3 0  If and when  does  the  Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment apply to separate civil
forfeiture  and  criminal  proceedings,  or to  separate  civil  pen-
alty and criminal  proceedings?32  Does the preventive  detention
21 See, e.g.,  E.B. v. Verniero,  119 F.3d  1077  (3d Cir.  1997)  (upholding the commu-
nity notification  provisions  of "Megan's  Law"  against constitutional challenge);  Art-
way v. Attorney General  of NewJersey,  81 F.3d  1235  (3d Cir.)  (en banc)  (upholding
the sex offender registration  provisions of NewJersey's "Megan's Law" against consti-
tutional attack),  reh'g  denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996).
2  See, e.g., Kansas  v.  Hendricks,  117 S.  Ct. 2072  (1997)  (upholding Kansas'  "sexu-
ally violent predator" statute).
"  See Austin v.  United States,  509 U.S.  602, 622  (1993)  (holding that the Eighth
Amendment  requires proportionality  of civil  forfeitures, but leaving open  the ques-
tion as to what exactly the forfeitures must be proportionate).
" See United States  v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267  (1996)  (holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does not bar separate  civil  forfeiture and criminal  proceedings premised
on the same underlying conduct).
32  Compare  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50  (1989)  (holding that the
Double Jeopardy  Clause bars  later criminal proceedings  when  earlier civil penalties
are  so  disproportionate  to  the  injury  caused  that  they should be  deemed punitive
rather than "remedial"),  with Hudson v. United States, 118 S.  Ct. 488  (1997)  (overrul-
ing Halper and holding that the Double Jeopardy  Clause bars later criminal proceed-
ings  only when  earlier  civil  penalties  should  be  considered  "criminal"  punishment
under the  multi-factor test announced in  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372  U.S.  144
(1963)).
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of pre-trial  detainees  constitute  criminal  punishment  without
trial in violation of the Due Process Clause? 33  And does the in-
definite  civil commitment of "sexually violent predators" at the
conclusion of their prison terms constitute new punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto  and Double Jeopardy provisions
of the  Constitution? 4  More  generally,  should  putatively  civil
penalties and restraints be considered  "really" criminal punish-
ments based on the government's  motivation, if one can be dis-
cerned?  Or on the effect such penalties and restraints have on
the individual on whom they are imposed?  Or on how the rele-
vant community would understand the imposition of such pen-
alties and restraints?  Scholars  as  well  as courts  have begun  to
engage  these cases and questions, offering different theories  of
how we might identify hidden but "real" criminal punishment
that must be  subject to  our constitutional  constraints  on  "the
punitive state." 3 5
The  urgency  and  complexity  of  this  first  problem  has
tended  to obscure  a second problem, which is  also  in need of
careful  attention, but which  has not yet been generally  recog-
nized  as a problem.  What constitutional  and/or policy  limits
are there on the non-punitive "preventive" state?  Even if certain
policies and practices  do  not implicate  the special  substantive
and  procedural  constraints  that we  place  on  criminal punish-
ment,  they  may well  implicate  other  constitutional  provisions
and/or policy concerns.  This point is all too often lost.  Courts
and commentators  often tend to  conclude, too quickly, that if
some policy or practice is not "really" punishment, then there is
nothing wrong with it. And they often treat preventive searches
and seizures  as  inherently  far less problematic  than  those  en-
"  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.  739  (1987)  (upholding the constitutional
validity of pretrial preventive detention under certain circumstances).
-" See Hendricks, 117 S.  Ct. at  2072  (upholding the civil  commitment of "sexually
violent predators" under certain circumstances).
I am myself one of the scholars who has recently engaged the problem of identi-
fying which putatively civil penalties and restraints are "really" criminal punishment.
See  Carol  S.  Steiker,  Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory  and the
Criminal-Civil  Procedural  Divide, 85  GEO.  J.L. 775  (1997)  [hereinafter  Steiker, Punish-
ment and Procedure].  In addition to offering my own  theory (of course),  I canvass the
wide variety of cases that have recently raised this question, see id. at 778-80, and note
the burgeoning recent literature on the topic, see id. at 781 & nn.41-43.
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gaged  in  for  the  purposes  of investigating  and  prosecuting
crime.
Not only do courts and commentators often trivialize objec-
tions  to actions  of a "merely" preventive  (as  opposed  to  puni-
tive)  state,  they also do  not tend to see the  various preventive
policies and practices canvassed above as part of a unified prob-
lem.  Instead, the cases and commentary on these issues have a
fragmented and haphazard quality.  On the procedural side, the
legal  issues posed  by  "preventive" policing  have  not  generally
been  seen  as  related  to  the  larger  category  of  preventive
searches and seizures  by non-police entities in non-investigative
capacities.  Thus, those writing about community policing initia-
tives have had little to say about, for example, random drug test-
ing  programs.  And  on  the  substantive  side,  few  connections
have  been made  between  the main categories  of preventive re-
straints,  such  as  pre-trial  detention,  civil  commitment  of the
dangerous  mentally ill, and the incarceration  of delinquent ju-
veniles.  Rather, each  individual  preventive  practice  has been
treated as sui generis rather than as a facet of a larger question in
need of a more general conceptual framework.
The  neglect  of this  second problem-the  problem  of  the
limits of the preventive state-is traceable, at least in part, to the
text and history of the Constitution.  At the time of the drafting
and  ratifying  of the  Constitution,  the  dangers of the  punitive
state were well known.  Thus, the Founders were careful  to in-
clude in our foundational text the many references noted above
to  particular  criminal  processes  and  protections  in  order  to
cabin appropriately  the punitive  power of the new federal  gov-
ernment.  The preventive  state became possible only as the next
century progressed, with the invention of modem police forces36
and total institutions  like  the prison,  the  mental hospital,  and
the home for juvenile delinquents.
3 7  The growth of the regula-
'  See Carol S. Steiker,  Second Thoughts About First Principles,  107 HARv.  L  REv. 820,
833  (1994)  [hereinafter  Steiker,  Second  Thoughts]  (describing  the  development  of
modern police forces as "one of the  'major social inventions'  of the nineteenth cen-
tury")  (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,  CRIME AND PUNISHMENT  IN AMERICAN HISTORY
67 (1993)).
37 See Steiker, Punishment and  Procedure,  supra note 35, at 788  (describing "the great
period of prison and asylum building in the early nineteenth century...").
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tory state in the post-New Deal Twentieth Century further estab-
lished  the  pervasive  presence  and  knowledge  of the  state  in
many guises,  creating  new opportunities  for prophylactic  state
action.!  But as a matter of constitutional  interpretation,  most
of these new institutions and their powers could be cabined only
under  the  most  general  rubrics  of the  Constitution,  like  the
Fourth  Amendment's  proscription  of "unreasonable"  searches
and seizures  and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'  Due
Process Clauses.  Thus, it is harder to see the preventive state as
a category than it is to so view the punitive state.
Much,  however,  stands  to  be  gained  by  recognizing  the
connections  among the various policies of the preventive  state.
First, once it becomes  explicit that there  is a separate category
of restrictions  on  state  actions,  courts  and commentators  who
are  alarmed about the use  of certain  state practices-such  as,
for example,  various  forms  of preventive  detention-need  no
longer try to frame their concerns only or primarily as concerns
about the punitive state.  We can thus have freer and more pro-
ductive analyses  of what limits we should place,  as a matter of
constitutional law or public policy, on the preventive state even
when  it is  not acting  as criminal  punisher.  Second,  the con-
cerns that have been  raised about certain  preventive  practices
may shed light on what may  (or may not) be cause for concern
about other preventive  practices.  The circumstances  in which
sex offender registration may be constitutionally permissible  or
wise  as a matter  of policy might inform  other preventive  proj-
ects,  such  as the creation  of DNA  or fingerprint banks,  which
may inform yet other preventive policing policies.  Similarly, the
concerns  raised  about  the  detention  of juvenile  delinquents
share  many salient  similarities  with  the concerns  raised about
other forms  of preventive/rehabilitative  detention, such  as the
pre-trial  detention  of dangerous  defendants,  the  detention  of
the dangerous mentally ill, and the quarantine of the those with
dangerous  communicable  diseases.  Moving up a level  of con-
ceptual generalization  may well create  new insights  about par-
ticular practices.  Finally, given the exceptionally particularized
"  See Stuntz, supra  note  17, at 1018-19  (describing the new information-gathering
attributes of the post-New Deal state).
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way in which the  law has  developed  on these  issues up to this
point, raising  the  level  of conceptual  generalization  may well
create  a  greater  degree  of predictability  for federal  and  state
policy-makers  and  for  individuals  concerned  about  their  civil
liberties.
In  order  to demonstrate  the need for a  more  general  dis-
cussion of the limits of the preventive  state and to suggest some
of the questions that any such discussion must address, I will ex-
amine two of the Supreme Court's cases  of last Term  (October
Term  1996)-decisions  not thought to  have  much  to do  with
one another.  The first, Kansas v. Hendricks,9  is  a "substantive"
law  case,  which  considered  the  constitutional  validity  of  the
State  of Kansas'  "sexually violent  predator" law permitting the
indefinite  civil  commitment  of certain  sex  offenders  after the
conclusion  of  their  prison  terms.  The  second,  Chandler v.
Miller, 0  is  a  "procedural" case,  which  considered  the  constitu-
tionality of the State of Georgia's requirement that certain  can-
didates  for state  office  submit  to  urinalysis  drug testing.1  In
each of these opinions the Supreme  Court failed to conceive  of
its decision in the case before  it as part of the larger task of de-
limiting the powers of the preventive  state.  As a result, each  of
these  opinions  is less  illuminating and useful  than it  otherwise
might be.  I  will  try  to  explain  the  ways  in  which the  Court's
analysis in these cases is unsatisfying and to suggest some of the
questions that the Court might have asked had it formulated the
cases as I suggest.  Providing good answers to these questions is
"117  S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
40117 S. Ct.  1295 (1997).
'  I  put "substantive" and "procedural"  in  quotes because  these terms  reflect the
standard  division  of constitutional  provisions relating  to  criminal  law.  Substantive
limits on the state's power to enact criminal laws-such as the prohibition of ex post
facto  laws and  the  void for vagueness  doctrine-are  typically  conceived  of, written
about, and taught separately  from the procedural limits on the state's power to inves-
tigate and prosecute crime under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.  But this
received distinction, like many such distinctions,  is  not entirely satisfactory.  For ex-
ample, there is a strong connection between  the "substantive" void for vagueness doc-
trine and  "procedural"  limitations on  discretionary  police  power under  the Fourth
Amendment.  Nonetheless, I will continue  to refer to  Hendricks and  Chandler,  respec-
tively,  as a  "substantive" or "procedural" decision  in  order to  recognize  the way  in
which they are generally considered to be separate and distinct.
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a much larger task which  I hope  to prod others  to undertake
and to which I hope to return in the future.
II.  KANSAS  v. HENDPJCIm.  THE SUBSTANTIVE LMrrs
OF THE PREVENTIVE  STATE
The Supreme Court's upholding against constitutional chal-
lenge of Kansas'  "sexually violent predator" statute was  a high-
profile  decision  with  important  implications  for  the  nearly
twenty  (by one Justice's count) other states with similar statutes
authorizing civil commitment or other mandatory treatment for
sexually dangerous persons.4 2  The decision was-or should have
been-even  more  significant  outside  of the  narrow,  but  bur-
geoning  area  of sex  offender  policy.  The  use  of  civil,  non-
punitive confinement to incapacitate or treat (or both) danger-
ous  persons  has  been  a recurring  constitutional  question  for
policy-makers and courts in the latter part of this century.  From
the  confinement  of juveniles  found to  be delinquent,4 3  to the
civil commitment of the dangerous mentally ill,44 to the pre-trial
detention  of  certain  dangerous  criminal  defendants,5  the
United  States  Supreme  Court has  grappled  with  defining the
limits of the state's ability to use what we have come to call "total
institutions" to deal prophylactically with  dangerous deviance.46
Yet the Court's decisions  rarely speak either to one another or
to the problem in generalized terms, and thus the boundaries of
the state's power in this important realm remain hazy and hap-
hazard.  The  Hendricks case  offered  an important opportunity
for the Court to take stock and address this issue more globally,
but that opportunity was unfortunately squandered.  Why and
how that opportunity was lost and what might have been done
instead are my topics here.
12  See Hendricks, 117 S.  Ct. at  2099  (Appendix of "Selected Sexual  Offense  Com-
mitment Statutes")  (Breyer,J., dissenting).
4'  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41  SeeAddington  v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
" See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
46 See ERVING GOFFMAN,  AsYLUMS xiii (1961) (describing a total institution as "a place
of residence  and work where a large number of like-situated individuals,  cut off from
the wider society for an  appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed,  for-
mally administered round of life.").
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The state statute at issue in Hendricks established procedures
for the civil commitment of persons who, after being "convicted
of or charged with a sexually violent offense," are found to suf-
fer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" which
makes them "likely to  engage" in "predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence."47  The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the statute  on
federal substantive  due  process  grounds, holding that involun-
tary civil commitment must be predicated  on a finding of "men-
tal illness," which the statute  did not specifically  require. 48  The
United States Supreme  Court granted the state of Kansas'  peti-
tion for certiorari, which disputed the Kansas  Supreme  Court's
due process  analysis,  as well as Hendricks'  cross-petition, which
asserted additional federal  constitutional  challenges  to the stat-
ute based on the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. 9
Justice  Thomas  wrote  for a  five-person  majority, reversing
the decision  of the  Kansas  Supreme  Court and rejecting  Hen-
dricks'  additional  constitutional  challenges  that had not been
considered by the Kansas Court. Justice Thomas' majority opin-
ion was  devoted disproportionately  to the issues  raised by Hen-
dricks'  cross-petition-issues  that  together  presented  the
general question  of whether Kansas'  civil commitment of sexu-
ally  violent  predators  actually  constituted  a form  of criminal
punishment, which would clearly run afoul of both the Ex Post
Facto  and  the  Double Jeopardy  Clauses.  After  much  lengthy
analysis about the  statute's purpose  and effect, Justice  Thomas
rejected  Hendricks'  claims,  concluding  that  Hendricks  had
failed to provide "'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme
[is]  so  punitive  either  in purpose  or effect  as  to negate  [the
State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'
5 0
The four dissenting Justices,  who  all joined  an opinion  by
Justice  Breyer, dissented only on the  issue  of whether the  stat-
ute, despite  its putatively civil nature, actually imposed criminal
punishment  (and thus ran  afoul  of the  Constitutional  Ex  Post
47 
KAN. STAT.  ANN.  § 59-29a02(a)  (1994).
'a See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129  (Kan.  1996).
'9 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
'0 Hendricks, 117 S.  Ct. at 2082  (citing United  States v. Ward,  448 U.S.  242,  248-49
(1980)).
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Facto prohibition)."  Justice  Breyer concluded  that the statute
did in fact amount  to criminal  punishment, primarily because
the Kansas legislature "did not tailor the statute to fit the non-
punitive civil aim of treatment, which it concedes exists in Hen-
dricks'  case." 5  Justice Breyer was careful to avoid asserting that
treatment  must  always attend  involuntary  civil  commitment;
rather, he argued  more  narrowly that if a state's putative  pur-
pose  in employing  civil  commitment  is  treatment,  and  treat-
ment is available,  and the person civilly committed is treatable,
then the state's failure  to provide  such treatment  at an appro-
priate  time  is  convincing  evidence  that the  state's  actual  pur-
pose is to punish. 3
Justice  Kennedy,  while  joining Justice  Thomas'  majority
opinion,  also  wrote  a  brief concurrence  expressing  sympathy
with  the dissenters'  cause,  though not agreeing with  their ulti-
mate conclusion. 4  He, too, focussed his discussion on the pun-
ishment issue.  While Justice Kennedy fully joined the majority's
analysis  and rejection  of Hendricks'  ex post facto  and double
jeopardy  claims,  he  cautioned  against  the  "dangers  inherent
when  a civil  confinement  law  is used  in conjunction  with  the
criminal  process"55 and  appeared  to  promise  future  vigilance
against attempts  by states to use civil confinement as "a mecha-
nism for retribution or general deterrence. 56
This  disproportionate  focus  on  the  punishment  issue  is
symptomatic  of the way in which  the question of the limits  of
the preventive  state  tends to become marginalized.  It is  often
recognized that because the Constitution so explicitly cabins the
"Justice  Ginsburg,  interestingly,  did not join Part I of Justice  Breyer's opinion,
which essentially concurred with the majority's treatment of the main substantive due
process  holding of the Kansas Supreme  Court.  Id. at 2087.  She did  not, however,
write a separate opinion stating her views on the substantive due process issue.
12  Id. at 2098  (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer also raised without purporting
to decide  the question  of whether Kansas'  failure "to provide  treatment that it con-
cedes  is  potentially  available  to  a  person  whom  it  concedes  is  treatable"  could  be
framed as a violation  of substantive due process  in addition  to a violation  of the ex
post facto clause.  Id. at 2090 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2096 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
I 41d. at 2087 (KennedyJ., concurring).
"Id.  (Kennedy,J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy,  J., concurring).
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use  of the  penal  sanction,  there  is  incentive  for  the  state  to
avoid these restrictions by turning to various civil restraints as al-
ternative  means  of punishment.7  But it  is  not often  enough
recognized that because the Constitution so explicitly cabins the
use of the penal sanction, there is incentive for individuals sub-
ject to civil restraints to portray them as punitive, so as to invali-
date or at least diminish them.  Thus, the explicit quality of the
limitations  on the punitive state creates skewed litigation incen-
tives for the  individuals who are  the necessary  sources  of chal-
lenges to preventive  state practices and policies.  They stand to
win and win big if they can convince a court that the state is in-
flicting "punishment."  It is much harder to attempt to make out
a substantive due process claim, especially in light of the paucity
of the Court's precedents in this area.  Thus, litigants tend to try
to squeeze  all of their objections to state practices into their ar-
gument  that the practices  are  punitive.  And  courts  and com-
mentators  tend  to  take  their  cue  from  litigants, judging from
the recent outpouring of cases and articles  on the punishment
question 8 as compared to the relative silence on the question of
the limits of the preventive state.
The Supreme Court could have resisted this skewing in the
Hendricks case.  After all,  the Kansas  Supreme  Court framed its
decision  in terms of substantive  due process, 9 and the punish-
ment issue  came  to  the  United  States  Supreme  Court only by
way of its grant of Hendricks'  cross-petition for certiorari.6°  De-
spite this state of affairs, the Court-both  majority and dissent-
ingJustices-still managed to be little more than perfunctory in
their treatment  of the  substantive  due process  issue.  Thus,  in
Hendricks, as in many other discussions  of the limits of the pre-
ventive state, the punishment question tended to dominate and
to  leave the mistaken  impression that if the state is not punish-
ing, it is not doing anything objectionable at all, constitutionally
speaking or otherwise.
17  See Steiker, Punishment  and  Procedure,  supra note 35, at 810.
Id. at 778-81  (canvassing recent discussions and scholarship on this question).
In reHendricks, 912 P.2d 129  (Kan. 1996).
"See  Cross Petition for Certiorari, 116 S. Ct. 2522  (1996).
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What  was the  Court's  treatment  of Hendricks'  substantive
due process claim?  The claim on which Hendricks  prevailed in
the Kansas  Supreme Court was the argument that the  involun-
tary,  indefinite  civil  commitment  of  a  dangerous  person  re-
quires  proof not only  of dangerousness,  but  also  of "mental
illness."6'  Hendricks  pointed  out,  correctly,  that  the  United
States  Supreme  Court  had  not  ever  previously  upheld  civil
commitment  schemes  with  criteria  as  vague  and  potentially
broad as Kansas'  language of "mental abnormality" or "person-
ality disorder."  The majority made quick work of this argument.
Justice Thomas  summarized  the Court's  precedents  in  a novel
and somewhat  disingenuous  way,  stating,  'We  have  sustained
civil  commitment  statutes  when  they  have  coupled  proof  of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as
a 'mental  illness'  or 'mental  abnormality"'6 --while  failing  en-
tirely to observe  that the precedents he cited in support of this
claim never endorsed the broad language of "mental abnormal-
ity," but instead used narrower  (though not themselves  uncon-
troversial)  terms such as  "mentally ill" or "mentally retarded.6 3
The point, of course,  of limiting involuntary  civil  commitment
to  those who are mentally ill is  to reserve  indefinite  civil  com-
mitment to those who are truly incapable  of choosing to under-
stand or to comply with the law; those able to so  choose should
have  their  liberty  and  their  autonomy  respected  by  being
treated as rational beings-and thus prosecuted pursuant to the
criminal law should they choose to do wrong.  Justice  Thomas
recognized  this  implicit rationale  in  his  opinion  in Hendricks,
finding that "the Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other
civil  commitment  statutes"  because  "it  links  [a  finding  of
dangerousness]  to  the  existence  of a  'mental  abnormality'  or
'personality disorder'  that makes  it difficult, if not impossible,
61 Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
6  Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
"See,  e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15  (1993)  (Kentucky statute permitting
commitment of "mentally retarded" or "mentally  ill" and dangerous  individual); Al-
len  v.  Illinois, 478  U.S. 364, 366  (1986)  (Illinois statute  permitting commitment of
"mentally  ill" and dangerous individual);  Minnesota  ex reL Pearson v. Probate  Court
of Ramsey  County, 309 U.S.  270,  271-72  (1940)  (Minnesota statute  permitting com-
mitment of dangerous individual with "psychopathic personality").
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for  the  [committed]  person  to  control  his  dangerous  behav-
ior.''
4  Justice  Thomas found  Kansas'  definition of "mental ab-
normality" to be "comparable" to the criteria set forth in other,
less controversial, civil commitment statutes.6
Unfortunately, there  is not much  basis for Justice  Thomas'
sanguine  conclusion  that there  is  nothing particularly  new  or
unusual about Kansas'  choice  of statutory language.  Although
experts do, of course,  disagree about the scope of what consti-
tutes "mental illness" or "mental retardation," there can be little
doubt that whatever  the outer limits of these concepts are, they
do  not  come  even  close  to  the  potential  outer  limits  of the
much fuzzier concepts of "abnormality" or "disorder."  At some
level, virtually all of those who choose to commit criminal  acts,
especially  those who commit unusually violent or otherwise  ab-
horrent crimes  (like sexual assaults on children)  can be consid-
ered  "abnormal."  And  the  range  of potential  "disorders"  is
likewise  extraordinarily  broad,  even  among  mental  health  ex-
perts.66  The concept of "mental illness,"  however defined, car-
ries  with  it  the  legal  connotation  (although  not  the  strict
definition)  of the kind of mental state sufficient to impair cog-
nition or volition so seriously as to render an individual  legally
irresponsible and thus not properly subject to criminal punish-
ment.6
7  Hence the need for non-criminal incapacitation and/or
61 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.  This quote  is  followed by a citation to that section
of the Kansas statute defining "mental abnormality" as  a "congenital or acquired con-
dition affecting the emotional or volitional  capacity which predisposes  the person  to
commit sexually  violent offenses in  a degree constituting  such person  a menace  to
the health and safety of others."  See id. (quoting KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 59-29a02(b)).
651&
For example, the same diagnostic  manual cited by Justice Thomas  to character-
ize Hendricks' pedophilia as a "serious mental disorder" also included descriptions  of
"Caffeine-Induced  Disorder," "Nicotine-Induced Disorder," and "Male Erectile Disor-
der."  See The Supreme Court, 1996-Leading Cases, 111  HARV.  L. REV. 259,  267  (1997)
(citing Brief of the American  Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici  Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 13, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075)  (citing AMERICAN  PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL  MANUAL OF  MENTAL  DISORDERS 212, 244,  502  (4th
ed. 1994))).
67 See,  e.g.,  MODEL  PENAL  CODE §  4.01  (Proposed  Official  Draft  1962) (excluding
criminal  responsibility for someone suffering from  a "mental disease  or defect" such
that "he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law").
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treatment.  In contrast, the concepts of "abnormality" and "dis-
order"  carry the  legal connotation  of circumstances  that  con-
strain choice  to a much lesser degree.6 8  And since  all of us are
constrained  in  our choices  to  some  degree,  the  line between
normal and abnormal seems  virtually impossible to draw.  Are
drug addicts, alcoholics,  smokers, or caffeine-ingesters  suffering
from a "mental abnormality"?  How about victims of childhood
sexual or other abuse?  Or combat veterans with post-traumatic
stress disorder?  Or women suffering from severe Pre-Menstrual
Syndrome?  Or how about  the  now almost quaint  concept  of
"evil"-the  category  of "bad" people, who  seem  indifferent  to
the suffering of others?
Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer both finesse this concern
in the same way: whether or not the statutory language of Kan-
sas'  "Sexually Violent Predator Act" strictly requires  the degree
of  volitional  impairment  sufficient  for  indefinite,  involuntary
civil  commitment,  the  record clearly  demonstrated  that Leroy
Hendricks  suffered from just such a degree of impairment.  He
testified himself that he was unable to "control the urge" to mo-
lest children when he became  "stressed out" and that the only
way to be sure that he would not sexually abuse more children
in the  future  would  be  "to  die."O '  Justice  Thomas  concluded
that "[t]his  admitted lack  of volitional  control  ...  adequately
distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are
perhaps more  properly dealt with  exclusively  through criminal
proceedings."0  Justice Breyer essentially reached the same con-
clusion-that Hendricks'  particular kind of disorder and his de-
tailed testimony about it sufficed to render the use of the statute
in his case constitutional.
7
1  Because Justice Thomas and Justice
6"  SeeHendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (withholding  judgment
on whether "mental abnormality" is "too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for
concluding that civil detention  is justified").
'9 Id at 2081  (citing to Record in the joint Appendix).
70 id.
7,  As Justice Breyer noted:
Because  (1)  many  mental  health  professionals  consider  pedophilia  a  serious
mental disorder;  and  (2)  Hendricks suffers from a classic case  of irresistible im-
pulse, namely he is so afflicted with pedophilia that he cannot "control the urge"
to  molest children; and  (3)  his pedophilia  presents  a serious danger  to  those
children; I believe that Kansas can classify Hendricks as "mentally ill" and "dan-
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Breyer  and, indeed,  all  of the Justices  on the Court  (with the
possible  exception of  Justice  Ginsburg) 72 could agree that Hen-
dricks himself was properly subject to involuntary  civil commit-
ment, none of them found it necessary to tell us anything more
about anyone else.  Given that the majority opinion, unlike the
dissent,  endorsed  not  only  Hendricks'  incarceration,  but  the
statutory language  as  well, future policy-makers  and courts  will
remain  at a loss  to determine  the  degree  of cognitive  or voli-
tional  impairment necessary  as a predicate  to the indefinite in-
carceration of the dangerous.
Indeed, policy-makers might even question whether  any de-
gree  of cognitive  or volitional impairment  will be  held  by the
Court to be  a necessary predicate  for the  indefinite  incarcera-
tion  of  the  dangerous  in  the  future,  given  Justice  Thomas'
statement in  his majority opinion  that Hendricks'  lack of voli-
tional  control  adequately  distinguishes  him  "from  other  dan-
gerous  persons  who  are  perhaps more  properly  dealt  with
exclusively  through  criminal  proceedings.0 3   This  tantalizing
"perhaps" leaves open the door for future decisions permitting
the  incarceration  of the dangerous, period-without  any need
to restrict the  class of those  incarcerated  to the special  case  of
the mentally ill.  Surprisingly, not a single member of the four-
person  dissent  voiced  concerns  about  either  the  majority's
equation  of "mental  abnormality"  with  "mental illness"  or  the
majority's apparent equivocation on the need for such an equa-
tion.  Only Justice  Kennedy, in  his brief concurrence,  flagged
this issue  for the  future in a short and vague  clause, buried  in
his paragraph-long conclusion:
On the record before us, the Kansas civil statute conforms  to our prece-
dents.  If, however,  civil confinement were  to become a mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence,  or if it were shown that mental abnormal-
ity is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis  for concluding that civil deten-
tion is  justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it.74
gerous"  as  this  Court  used  those  terms  in  Foucha [v.  Louisiana,  504  U.S.  71
(1992)].
Id. at 2089  (BreyerJ., dissenting).
72  See supra  note  51.
7'Hendricks,  117 S. Ct. at 2081  (emphasis added).
71  Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring)  (emphasis added).
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Given the majority's conclusion that "mental abnormality" is not
any more  problematic  than "mental illness" 75  and the  dissent's
apparent lack of interest in this topic, it is unclear whether any-
one except perhaps Justice Kennedy will be watching the future
application  of Kansas'  statute  or  other public  policy  develop-
ments as carefully as one might hope.
In  addition to  its  surprising  and  distressing  lack of clarity
about the degree  of cognitive  or volitional impairment  neces-
sary to permit the indefinite incarceration of the dangerous, the
Court was  also utterly silent on many other issues surrounding
the proper use  of civil commitment.  Granted, the issue  about
the meaning  and permissibility of the language of "mental ab-
normality" was explicitly argued and briefed by the parties, and
there  is  thus particular  reason  to  expect  clarity  on  this point.
However, Justice  Breyer  seems  clearly correct  that the  Kansas
Supreme Court also appeared  to rest its substantive  due process
analysis  on  the  state's failure  to provide  Hendricks  with treat-
ment during  his  incarceration. 7 6  The  majority  opinion  com-
pletely missed  this  point, addressing  only the Kansas  Supreme
Court's holding that the "mental abnormality" language was in-
sufficient.77  While both the majority and the dissent seemed to
agree that treatment is not an indispensable feature of the civil
commitment  of  the  mentally  ill  and  dangerous,  particularly
when no effective  treatment of a individual is possible, they dis-
agreed  on what a state's obligation should be when  such treat-
ment  is  possible  and  is  at  least  a  plausible  purpose  of  the
commitment.
Justice Breyer's dissenting position on this question is quite
clear,7 8 but Justice Thomas'  position for the majority is impene-
trable,  largely because of Justice  Thomas'  apparent misreading
of the  analysis of the court below.  Justice Thomas did not ap-
T5  See supra note 61-63 and accompanying text.
"6 Id. at 2090  (Breyer, J., dissenting)  (citing  relevant portions of the Kansas  Su-
preme Court's opinion).
7  See id. at 2079-81.
7' See id. at 2096  (BreyerJ., dissenting)  ("[When a State decides offenders can be
treated and confines  an offender to provide  that treatment, but then refuses to pro-
vide it, the  refusal to treat while a person  is fully incapacitated  begins to look puni-
tive.").
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pear to realize  (as Justice Breyer did)  that the Kansas  Supreme
Court was arguing that the purely incapacitative confinement of
the dangerous but treatable mentally ill violated the due process
clause.  Rather, he understood the Kansas Supreme Court to be
arguing  one of two  other things.  First, Justice  Thomas under-
stood the Kansas Court to be arguing that because there was no
effective  treatment  possible  for  sexually  violent predators,  the
state's  purpose  in indefinitely confining  such  offenders  was  to
inflict  criminal  punishment.  He  easily  disposed  of this  argu-
ment  of by  maintaining"-without  disagreement  from Justice
Breyer's  dissent-that  incapacitation  alone,  quite  apart  from
rehabilitation,  could suffice  as a sufficient, non-punitive  ration-
ale for the civil  commitment  of the  dangerous but untreatable
mentally  ill. 79  Second,  and  in  the  alternative, Justice  Thomas
understood the Kansas Court to be arguing that although Hen-
dricks'  condition was treatable, Kansas'  primary purpose in con-
fining him was not treatment and in fact, the State of Kansas was
not providing  him  treatment, so that the  state's purpose,  once
again,  must be  punitive.  In response  to  this perceived  argu-
ment, Justice  Thomas became  quite vague.  On the one  hand,
he  suggested  that  treatment  need  not  be  a state's  "primary"
purpose  in incarcerating  the dangerous  but treatable  mentally
ill,8 "'  but he  did  not  answer  the  question  whether  a state  may
choose  simply  to segregate  the  dangerous  mentally ill without
providing any treatment, even when such treatment is possible.82
On  the other hand, Justice Thomas  suggested,  contrary to the
conclusions  of the  Kansas  Supreme  Court, that treatment actu-
ally was being provided.  In support of this determination, how-
ever, Justice Thomas  cited nothing in the  record, but rather a
statement made  by  the  Kansas  Attorney  General  at oral  argu-
ment and  a statement  made  by a  Kansas  trial  court judge  at a
state habeas proceeding long after the  date of Hendricks'  own
commitment.8'  Thus,  the  majority  opinion  leaves  hanging
79  See id. at 2083-84.
Id. at 2084.
8'  Id.  at 2084-85.
82  id.
"Id.  at 2085 & n.5 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15,  16; App. 453-54);  see id. at 2096-97
(BreyerJ., dissenting).
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much more than it resolves, in particular,  two important  ques-
tions: (1) to what degree must states intend to treat those whom
it confines  as  mentally ill and dangerous?  and  (2)  to what de-
gree must states actually follow through on treatment for those
whom it confines  as mentally ill and dangerous  (and what evi-
dence will suffice to establish the existence of such treatment)?
Finally, a host of other issues about the use of civil commit-
ment  also  remain  hanging after  the  Court's  decision  in  Hen-
dricks.  Justice  Thomas'  concluding  paragraph  to  his "punish-
ment" analysis reads  as a laundry list of features that convinced
him (and the Court) that the Kansas statute was not so punitive
in purpose and effect so as to constitute punishment:
Where  the  State has  "disavowed  any punitive  intent";  limited con-
finement to a small segment of particularly  dangerous individuals;  pro-
vided  strict  procedural  safeguards;  directed  that  confined  persons  be
segregated  from the general  prison  population  and afforded  the same
status  as others  who have  been  civilly  committed;  recommended  treat-
ment if such  is possible; and permitted immediate  release upon a show-
ing that the individual  is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we
cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.
84
Justice Thomas never tells us which of these things are necessary
or sufficient conditions for upholding a commitment statute as
non-punitive.  Moreover, he does not answer  (or even recognize
as an issue)  the following  question:  Once a court has become
convinced that a commitment statute is not punitive, are any of
the features Justice  Thomas  lists necessary,  as  a matter  of due
process, for a scheme of preventive incarceration?  For example,
one  could  imagine  a  clearly  preventive,  non-punitive  regime
that sweeps large numbers of potentially dangerous persons into
it (such as a regime in  which "mental abnormality" includes al-
coholism or drug  abuse).  Just how  "small" a segment  of the
population  must be  subject to  confinement  and just how "par-
ticularly dangerous" must this group be?  Outside of the context
of determining whether the state is punishing  (and even within
that context), no answers are forthcoming fromJustice Thomas'
analysis.
In  sum,  the majority  opinion in  Hendricks (and to  a lesser
extent, the dissent as well) failed to use the case  as an opportu-
a'  Id. at 2085.
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nity to clarify important issues regarding whether and what lim-
its  exist on  the  non-punitive  use  of civil  confinement  to  deal
with  dangerous  individuals.  The  majority  opinion  assumed
away or finessed the key issues presented squarely in the Kansas
Supreme Court's opinion that it reversed, and the dissent failed
to  challenge  this circumspection  except as it related to the  dis-
sent's  own  quite  narrow  analysis.  Moreover,  neither  opinion
(nor  Justice  Kennedy's concurrence)  made any effort to set the
Hendricks case  in  context:  where  does  Kansas'  sexually  violent
predator law fit in the context of other laws upheld by the Su-
preme Court?  Whereas the Court clearly saw analogies between
Kansas'  statute and more  general civil commitment laws,  it had
nothing at all to say about how  such statutes  relate to broader
and more diverse efforts  of the states  to use incarceration  pro-
phylactically, such as in the treatment ofjuvenile delinquents  or
the preventive  pretrial detention of criminal defendants.  Thus,
the light cast by Hendricks Court, dim and smoky as it already is,
illuminates  only a very small comer of a very large  area of the
law.
III.  CHANDLER V. MLLER  THE PROCEDURAL LIMITS
OF THE PREVENTIVE  STATE
The  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Chandler  struck  down
under the Fourth Amendment a Georgia statute requiring can-
didates for certain state offices  to submit to urinalysis drug test-
ing before  qualifying for nomination  or election.  The case  is
notable partly because it is the only one of the four drug testing
cases to reach the Court in the past eight years to be found con-
stitutionally infirm-and  by  an  8-1  margin,  at that.6  But  the
Chandler  decision is even more  remarkable for the lack of guid-
ance  that it, like  the Hendricks decision, offers lower courts  and
future  policy-makers-either  in the  narrow  (but burgeoning)
85 Chandler v.  Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
'6 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.  646  (1995)  (upholding suspicion-
less drug testing of high school athletes); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,  489 U.S. 656  (1989)  (upholding suspicionless drug  testing of certain Customs
Service employees);  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'  Ass'n, 489 U.S.  602  (1989)
(upholding suspicionless  drug and  alcohol testing of railway  employees involved  in
train accidents and of those who violate particular safety rules).
[Vol.  88THE  PREVENTIVE STATE
area of drug testing in the public sector or in the broader (and
also  burgeoning)  area  of suspicionless  searches  and  seizures
generally.
Hendricks and Chandler share a similar unsatisfying relation-
ship to the law of the preventive state.  In the case of Hendricks,
the use of involuntary "total" incarceration  is normally restricted
to  the  sphere  of substantive  criminal  law, as  punishment  for
criminal wrongdoing.  The use of such incarceration  as a pre-
ventive measure  is thought to be a special case  (heretofore gen-
erally  restricted  to  the mentally  incompetent).  But  although
Hendricks presented  important  issues  about  the  scope  of the
special case-and even about its specialness to begin with-the
Court's  decision failed to illuminate those  issues,  and, indeed,
managed to leave them even murkier than they were before the
case  arose.  Similarly, in the  case of Chandler,  searches and sei-
zures are normally thought to be reasonable investigative  meas-
ures under the Fourth Amendment  to the  extent that there  is
individualized  suspicion of wrongdoing." 7  Sometimes, this indi-
vidualized  suspicion  is present  in the  classic  form of a judicial
warrant supported by probable  cause;8  at other times, probable
cause  or articulable  suspicion  alone  suffice to justify a state in-
trusion.m  But  suspicionless  searches  and  seizures  are  excep-
tional under the Fourth Amendment-limited  to  a short  (but
growing)  list  of  circumstances,  a  subset  of which  has  been
termed by the Court to involve  "special needs.""  Once again,
however, despite  the opportunity in  Chandler to illuminate  the
meaning  of  "special"  in  a  new  context,  the  Supreme  Court
managed to leave this area, too, in twilight.
17 This understanding of the Fourth Amendment is reiterated a number of times in
Chandler  itself.  See,  e.g.,  Chandler,  117  S.  Ct. at  1301  ("To be  reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.").
'  See,  e.g.,  CHA.IES  H.  WHrrEBREAD  &  CHRISTOPHER  SLOBOGIN,  CRIM  NAL
PROCEDURE:  AN ANALYSIS  OF CASES AND CONCEPTS  § 4.05a (3d ed. 1992) (subchapter on
"Determining Whether a Search or Seizure  is Reasonable") (citing, inter alia, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
89  See, e.g.,  id. §§ 4.05(b),  (d),  11.03(a) (citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
'  See, e.g.,  id. §§ 11.03(b),  13 (citing, inter alia,  NewJersey  v. T.L.O.,  469 U.S. 325
(1985)).
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The  "special needs" justification  for suspicionless  searches
and seizures was born, ironically, in a case in which there was no
need to justify a suspicionless search and seizure.  In New Jersey v.
T.L. 0., 9'  the Court upheld a search by public school officials  of
a student suspected of smoking  in the bathroom, even  though
the  search  was  conducted without  a warrant or  even probable
cause.  The Court reasoned  that in the special  context of main-
taining  order in  a  school  environment,  school  officials  could,
consistent  with the  Constitution,  conduct  searches  of students
when  such  searches  are  reasonable  "under  all  the  circum-
stances"92 -a  fairly freewheeling  analysis,  but one which would
necessarily include the initial justification for the search and the
relationship  between the scope and intrusiveness  of the search
to that initial justification.  The Court observed that a search will
be justified  initially  "when  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has  violated  or  is  violating  either  the  law  or the  rules  of the
school.0
3  Given that the school officials  in the  case reasonably
suspected that a student, T.L.O., had been smoking in the bath-
room, and their seizure of her and search of her purse were rea-
sonably related  in  scope and intrusiveness  to their disciplinary
concerns,  the  school  officials'  actions were  "reasonable  under
all of the circumstances" and thus not "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment.94  The Court expressly declined  to decide
"whether individualized  suspicion  is an essential element of the
reasonableness  standard  we  adopt  for  searches  by  school
authorities." 95
9'469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
912  See id. at 341.
9'  Id.  at 342.
"  Id. at 343.  The Court was quite specific  about the justifications for the school of-
ficials'  treatment of T.L.O.  It concluded  that  the  initial detention  of T.L.O.  and
search  of her purse for cigarettes was justified by the suspicion that T.L.O.  had been
smoking in the bathroom.  Id. at 345.  When this initial  search revealed the presence
of rolling papers, a fuller search  of T.L.O.'s purse was justified, reasoned  the Court,
because there was then reasonable  suspicion  that marijuana  was  also present.  Id  at
347.  And, indeed, marijuana  and other evidence  that T.L.O.  had been  selling the
drug was obtained from her purse and  turned over by the school authorities  to law
enforcement agents.  See id.
9'  Id. at 342 n.8.
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In  a concurring  opinion, Justice  Blackmun  authored  the
phrase  that has come  to justify not only softening the constitu-
tional  preference  for  warrants  and  probable  cause,  but  also
abandoning  the need for any  sort of individualized  suspicion:
he recognized  that "exceptional circumstances"  may sometimes
arise  "in which  special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,  make  the  warrant  and  probable-cause  require-
ment  impracticable . . ,96  In  the  next  dozen  years, Justice
Blackmun's  solo musings  were  invoked  in half-dozen  majority
opinions  to justify  (until  Chandler) state  actions  otherwise  in-
compatible with "traditional" Fourth Amendment analysis.7
In  two  of these  instances,  the  Court invoked  the  "special
needs" rubric to justify searches and seizures in which there was
some  individualized  suspicion,  but  no  warrant  or  probable
cause.  In O'Connor  v. Ortega, 8 a plurality of the Court concluded
that the  government  as  employer  could  conduct  work-related
searches  of an employee's office without a warrant or probable
cause,  given the special concerns implicated in the running of
an efficient government office.  The plurality noted that this ex-
ception applied  even when  the  government  was  searching  for
evidence of employee misconduct, as long as the search was rea-
sonable under  all of the  circumstances.9  Because  the govern-
ment employer in  Ortega had some individualized  suspicion  of
wrongdoing  by  Ortega,  the  plurality  reserved  the  question
"whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
standard  of reasonableness  . . ."100  intoning  exactly  the  same
language that the Court had used in its T.L.O. opinion two years
earlier.
The same  year as  Ortega, the  Court also  decided  Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 101  which  upheld  a probation  officer's  search  of the
Id. at 351 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
"SeeVernonia  Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,  515 U.S. 646  (1995);  Skinner v. Railway La-
bor Executives'  Ass'n,  489  U.S. 602  (1989);  National Treasury  Employees  Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);  O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709  (1987); New York
v. Berger, 482 U.S. 691  (1987);  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
3 Ortega,  480 U.S. at 721.
Id. at 722.
'0'  Id. at 726.
'0' oiffin, 483 U.S. at 879-80.
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home  of a  probationer  pursuant  to  a  regulation  authorizing
such  searches when there  exist "reasonable grounds" to believe
contraband  is present.  Once  again,  the  Court found that the
state's interest in supervising probationers  constituted a "special
need" that rendered  unnecessary  (indeed, problematic)  either
reliance  on  a judicial  warrant or use  of a probable  cause  stan-
dard in the absence of a warrant.
1 0 2  But because the regulation
at issue called for some form of individualized  suspicion  ("rea-
sonable  grounds"),  the Court once  again  avoided comment on
the question of the relationship between the "special needs" ru-
bric and the possibility of completely suspicionless searches and
seizures.
Sandwiched in-between  Ortega and  Griffin, however,  came  a
case that used the "special needs" rubric for the first time to jus-
tify a search without any individualized suspicion at all.  In New
York v. Burger,' 0 4 the Court upheld a search, authorized by a state
regulatory  statute,  of an  automobile junkyard,  which  revealed
evidence  that stolen  cars  were  being  dismantled  by  the junk-
yard's  owner.  Relying  on  a  series  of earlier  cases  in  which
searches of "closely regulated" businesses were subjected to less
demanding  Fourth  Amendment  scrutiny,05  the  Court  con-
cluded  that  such  searches  constituted  situations  of  "special
need,"  citing  Blackmun's  T.L.O.  concurrence. 6   The  Burger
Court made  clear  that such  searches  could be  conducted  not
only without warrants,  but also  without any  quantum  of indi-
vidualized  suspicion  at all.07  The reasonableness  of such peri-
'02 Id. at 876.
3  see id.
'0'  482 U.S. 691, 715-16  (1987).
10' See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)  (upholding warrantless inspection  of
stone quarry business  by mine  inspectors  under the Mine  Safety  and Health Act  of
1977);  United  States v.  Biswell,  406  U.S.  311  (1972)  (upholding warrantless  inspec-
tion of the premises of a pawnshop operator who was licensed to sell certain weapons
pursuant  to  the  Gun  Control Act of 1968);  Colonnade  Catering  Corp.  v.  United
States, 397 U.S. 72,  77  (1970)  (disapproving warrantless search of a catering business
on  the  narrow  ground  that the  search  was not authorized  by  the  relevant  federal
revenue statutes, but noting that the liquor industry was "long subject to close super-
vision and inspection").
106 New  York,  482  U.S.  at  702  (citing  New Jersey  v.  T.L.O.,  469  U.S.  325,  353
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
107 id.
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odic  suspicionless  searches  lay not in  any particular reason  to
believe that the subject of the search had committed some sort
of wrongdoing;  rather, reasonableness  could be  established  by
the  existence  of (1)  a  "substantial" state  interest in regulating
the business at issue;  (2)  an inspection scheme that "reasonably
serves"  the  State's  substantial  regulatory  interest;  and  (3)  a
"constitutionally  adequate  substitute  for a warrant"  that limits
the  discretion  of authorized  inspectors  in conducting the rele-
vant searches.'08  The Court concluded that the constraints pres-
ent  in  the  statutory  scheme  at  issue  in  Burger were  adequate
given that the statute provided fair notice to the regulated busi-
ness  of the nature  of the searches  to which it could be  subject
and the identity of authorized inspectors, in addition to limiting
the  time,  place,  and  scope  of authorized  inspections.1°9  The
Burger  case could be portrayed  as simply a species of old wine in
a  new  bottle,  as  merely  ratifying  and  recasting  as  a  "special
need"  the  already  existing  category  of  "regulatory  searches."
But Burger raised  two related,  troubling  questions-one  about
the nature  of the old category of regulatory  searches  and one
about the  new rubric of special needs-that have yet to be an-
swered today, ten years later.
The  Burger case  exposed  the problematic  and  potentially
expansive  borderland  between  the supposedly  separate  catego-
ries of "regulation" and "criminal law enforcement."  The New
York  statutory  scheme  implicated  in  the  Burger case  required
operators ofjunkyards to, inter alia, obtain licenses, display their
registration numbers on all business documentation  and on ve-
hicles  and  parts  that  pass  through  their businesses,  maintain
"police books" recording the acquisition and disposition of mo-
tor vehicles  and vehicle parts, and make  these books available
for inspection by the police or agents of the Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles. 110  Failure to comply with these provisions was pun-
ishable not only by loss of license  or civil fines, but by criminal
penalties as well."'  So, when the police  came marching, unin-
Id.  at 702-03.
,o'  Id. at 711-12.
1o Id. at 704 (citing N.Y. VEH.  & TRMr. LAW-§§ 415-a5  (a),  (b) (McKinney  1986)).
..  Id. at 704-05.
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vited, into Burger's junkyard, looking for his registration num-
ber and demanding  to see  his police book, were they acting as
agents  of the  regulatory  state  or  as  criminal  law  enforcement
agents?
The  Burger Court attempted  to explain  that administrative
statutes and penal laws  "may have  the same  ultimate purpose  of
remedying the  social problem"  at issue,  but that regulation  is
distinct from law enforcement  in that the  former "set[s]  forth
rules  to  guide  an  operator's  conduct  of  the  business  and  al-
low[s]  government  officials  to ensure  that those  rules  are fol-
lowed,"  whereas  the  latter  emphasizes  "the  punishment  of
individuals for specific  acts of behavior." 2  This verbal  distinc-
tion is  not particularly  helpful,  to say the very least.  After  all,
one could easily say that the very purpose of the criminal law is
to "set forth  rules to guide  ...  conduct" and to  "allow govern-
ment officials to ensure that those rules are followed."  And it is
equally  obvious  that  "punishment  of  individuals  for  specific
acts"  is central to many regulatory regimes.  Perhaps  the Court
was  trying  to  suggest  that deterrence  of wrongdoing  through
close  monitoring is different  from deterrence  through punish-
ment  after  the fact.  But once  again,  close  monitoring deters
only because the person or persons monitored know that pun-
ishment will follow if the monitoring reveals wrongdoing.  Thus,
the Court's facile distinction  does not come close to clearly de-
fining the border between regulation and law enforcement nec-
essary for any "regulated business" exception to ordinary Fourth
Amendment analysis.
This borderline  problem  became  even  more  pronounced
once  the  Supreme  Court began to  conceive  of the  "regulated
business" exception  under  the rubric of "special  needs."  The
earlier "closely regulated business"  cases upon which the Burger
opinion  relied  had been  predicated  almost  exclusively  on the
decreased  expectation  of privacy  traditionally  entertained  by
owners  of such  businesses. 3  But once the Burger Court turned
to the rubric of "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement," it became even more crucial for the Court to dis-
1  Id.  at 704.
...  See supra note  105.
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tinguish "normal" law enforcement  (which would be  subject to
traditional  Fourth  Amendment  constraints)  from  the  "special
needs"  of the regulatory state  (which  would not).  When  the
regulatory state shares with the criminal law the same overarch-
ing goal of promoting compliance with the law, and seeks to use
both  criminal  sanctions  as one of its regulatory  strategies  and
police officers  as one of its authorized inspectors-all of which
was  true  in  Burger-it becomes  very  difficult  to  separate  the
"normal" from the "special" case.
This difficulty is more than academic, because  it represents
the  difficulty  of containing  the  "special  needs"  exception  to
manageable  proportions-of maintaining it as "exceptional" at
all.  This concern became more apparent, though it was not re-
solved, in the case of Michigan Department of State Police v.  Sitz,1
4
in which  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  against Fourth  Amend-
ment challenge  a program  of suspicionless  stops and brief in-
spections of all vehicles passing through  "sobriety checkpoints"
established  on public roads.  The program,  which was  created
and implemented by the Michigan  State Police, was designed to
enforce the state's criminal prohibition of driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol.  For the first time, it was a criminal defendant
who invoked the Court's "special needs" cases, arguing that the
enforcement  of drunk  driving laws  fell,  if anything  at all  did,
within  the category  of "the  normal need  for criminal  law  en-
forcement"  and thus that law enforcement agents  should have
to  demonstrate  either probable  cause or reasonable  suspicion
before  executing  a warrantless  stop of an  automobile.15  The
Supreme  Court, however,  declined  to use  Sitz  as a vehicle  for
elaborating  on the distinction between  the "normal" and "spe-
cial" needs for law enforcement; instead, the Court narrowed its
focus and simply relied upon two  earlier cases  to deal with  the
drunk driving checkpoints  at issue in the case.  First, the Court
noted that it had already ruled that the Constitution permitted
law enforcement agents to conduct suspicionless stops of motor-
ists at fixed checkpoints near the border in order to detect the
"' 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
. See id. at 449-50  (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,  489
U.S. 656 (1989)).
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entry of illegal  aliens. 1 16  Second,  the Court invoked the  "test"
promulgated  in  Brown v.  Texas" 7  to  the effect that, in general,
determining the constitutionality of "seizures that are less intru-
sive than a traditional arrest...  involves a weighing of the grav-
ity of the public  concerns  served  by the seizure,  the degree  to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity
of the interference with individual liberty.""8
What the Sitz Court did not seem to realize, however, is that
the test that it adopted  involved exactly the same freewheeling
balancing that the Court employs under the "special needs" ru-
bric.  Should we understand  Sitz to say that we can resort to this
inclusive  balancing  either under  the  "special  needs"  rubric  or
when  evaluating seizures  less  intrusive  than  arrest?  Or should
we understand  Sitz to say that the "special needs" cases and the
checkpoint cases are just subsets of the general category of cases
in which searches  and seizures  are reasonable because  the gov-
ernment  interests  at  stake  outweigh  the  private  interests  at
stake?  In  other words,  does  the  word  "special"  denote  some-
thing unusual about the nature of the government's interest, or
does  it simply  reflect the relative  balance  of the  government's
interest and the individual's interest in a particular case?
It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  the  Supreme  Court  con-
fronted  the latest "special needs" case-Chandlei's  challenge  to
the  Georgia  statute  requiring  that candidates  for certain  state
offices  submit to drug testing in the  absence  of any individual-
ized  suspicion."9  Of course,  Chandler  was  not the  first  drug-
testing case  to reach  the Court.  The Court had previously  ap-
proved  suspicionless  testing for  drugs  and  alcohol  of railway
employees who were  involved in certain train accidents or who
had violated certain safety  rules,2 0  suspicionless drug testing of
Customs  Service  employees  applying  for  certain  transfers  or
..  See id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
117 443 U.S. 47,  51-53  (1979)  (holding that the Fourth Amendment  requires  the
police to have individualized  suspicion before they may stop individuals  and require
them to identify themselves, even in high crime areas).
18 Id. at 50-51  (citations omitted).
"9  Chandler v.  Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
SeeSkinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602  (1989).
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promotions,  and  suspicionless  drug  testing  of certain  high
school  athletes.  But each  of these  previous  cases  simply up-
held the testing on the particular facts presented  to the Court;
in none of these cases did the Court make any attempt to set out
the  necessary  or  sufficient  conditions  for  a  constitutionally
sound program of involuntary suspicionless  drug testing in the
public  sector, much  less  the  precise  contours  of the  "special
needs" exception more  generally.  Chandler  presented  the most
recent and  most compelling  opportunity for the  Court  to  ad-
dress these issues, given that the Court, for the first time, found
a drug-testing regime-or any governmental  interest framed as
a "special need"--to lie outside of the "special needs" rubric.
But the Court in  Chandler only perpetuated  the  confusion
already present in Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Acknowledg-
ing  that the  earlier drug testing  cases  and the  "special  needs"
rubric were the relevant touchstones for its analysis, the majority
opinion,  authored  by Justice  Ginsburg,  noted  that  Georgia's
plan for administering the drug tests-in the privacy of a medi-
cal office at a time chosen by the political candidate-was rela-
tively  non-invasive.1  Thus,  the  Court  construed  the  central
question at issue to be whether the state of Georgia had demon-
strated  a  "special  need"  that  was  "substantial-important
enough to override the individual's acknowledged  privacy inter-
est, sufficiently vital to suppress  the Fourth Amendment's  nor-
mal requirement of individualized suspicion." 24 This framing of
the  question managed  to  leave unresolved  precisely  the prob-
lematic  issue  raised  by  Sitz25  about  the  limits  of the  "special
needs" rubric: are the state's needs "special" because they are of
a certain nature or type  (i.e., regulatory as opposed to criminal)
or are they "special" simply because  they are important enough
to  outweigh  the  individual  liberty  interests  infringed  by  the
state's action?
1  SeeNational Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656  (1989).
' Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
'" ChandLer,  117 S.  Ct. at 1303.
124 id.
'2 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444  (1990).
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Justice  Ginsburg's  majority  opinion  gives  very  few  clues
about how the  Court should  or will  answer  this question.  On
the one hand, Justice  Ginsburg seems to affirm that traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis  is the  norm:  "The Fourth Amend-
ment...  generally  bars  officials from undertaking a search or
seizure  absent individualized  suspicion."28  Moreover, she  goes
on to insist that suspicionless  searches and seizures are not only
exceptional, but rare: she characterizes the category of constitu-
tionally permissible  suspicionless  searches  as  "closely guarded"
and  in particular,  she describes  the  Court's earlier  decision  in
Von  Raab (upholding suspicionless  drug testing of certain  Cus-
toms Service employees)  as "[h] ardly a decision opening broad
vistas for suspicionless searches."
27
On  the  other hand,  however, Justice  Ginsburg's  majority
opinion places few clear limits on the type of government inter-
est  that can  be  deemed  "special"  so  as  to  be  subject  to  the
Court's more  free-wheeling  and undoubtedly  more  deferential
balancing  analysis  instead  of  traditional  Fourth  Amendment
limitations.  The Court is emphatic that interests that are merely
"symbolic" and not "real"--as the Court deemed  Georgia's  in-
terests  to be in Chandler-will not be deemed  "special" govern-
mental  needs.
2 8   But  the  Court  doesn't  explain  how  lower
courts  or policy-makers  should identify "real" interests.  While
the Court criticizes  the State  of Georgia for not demonstrating
that a problem of drug use by state officials existed prior to the
enactment of its drug testing requirement, the majority opinion
also notes  that such a demonstration is  "not in all cases neces-
sary to the validity of a testing regime."'1  And while  the Court
criticizes  the  State  of  Georgia  for  enacting  a  drug  testing
scheme unlikely to detect and deter much illegal drug use  (be-
cause  the  candidates  subject to  testing  could  pick the  date  of
the  test themselves  well ahead  of time), Justice Rehnquist,  the
sole dissenter, seems to have a point when he notes that a better
26 Chandler,  117 S.  Ct. at 1298.
7 Id. at 1304  (construing National Treasury  Employees Union  v. Von  Raab, 484
U.S. 656 (1989)).
328 Id. at 1304-05.
2  Id.  at 1303.
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designed  scheme would  no doubt be much more  intrusive  on
liberty interests.'0
The only other definition  that the  Chandler Court offers for
the "special needs" rubric-aside from its insistence  that the as-
serted governmental interest be "important" and "real"-is that
the category embraces "concerns other than crime detection."'3'  At
first glance, this restriction seems like a helpful qualifier, able to
distinguish between the "normal" and "special" needs of law en-
forcement.  But once one takes into account the interests of the
preventive  as  well  as  the  punitive  state,  almost  every  law  en-
forcement initiative  can seem profoundly Janus-faced-looking
both backward to crime detection and forward to crime preven-
tion.  Take Sitz 32 as an example.  The defendants argued force-
fully that the use of sobriety checkpoints  constituted  classic law
enforcement of the crime detection sort-meant to catch those
driving  under  the  influence  of alcohol  and  subject  them  to
criminal  punishment.33  But  one  could  also  argue  that such
roadblocks constitute a forward-looking deterrent-surely, their
existence would make people think twice before getting behind
the wheel of a car while intoxicated, knowing that they would be
much more  likely to be caught.  Ultimately  the  Court ducked
this issue, upholding the checkpoints without opining about the
"specialness"  (or lack thereof) of the state's asserted interest.
34
But the  Chandler  Court's cryptic, almost throw-away definition of
"special needs" as concerns "other than crime detection"' ' 3 is of
little help in  classifying Sitz-or a myriad of other possible  law
enforcement initiatives.
The law enforcement initiatives left unsettled by the obscu-
rity of the Chandler  opinion include not only programs of suspi-
cionless drug testing, but also other schemes that likewise lie at
the  intersection  of the punitive and the  preventive  state.  For
example, consider the rapid development of DNA databases  or
'  Id. at 1307 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
"'Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See id. at 447-48.
"'Id.  at 455.
. Chandler,  117 S. Ct. at 1301.
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"banks" in virtually every state, which until now has been limited
to  collecting  DNA  information  from  convicted  felons,36  who
have  long been  held  to  have  reduced  expectations  of privacy
under  the  Fourth Amendment.
1 3 7   Under what  circumstances
may the federal or state governments  collect and use such valu-
able  and  accurate  information  from  citizens  other  than  con-
victs?  On  the one hand, one  could portray the collection  and
use of this information  as classic  "crime detection" in that DNA
tests often permit the police to identify after the fact the perpe-
trator of a prior, discrete crime.  On the other hand, however,
one could argue that DNA databases  are primarily prophylactic
in their deterrent effect upon people  who  might otherwise  be
disposed to commit crimes with the hope of "getting away with
it."  Does the  collection  of DNA information  constitute  a "spe-
cial need," in which case it might, under some circumstances,
38
be done in the absence of individualized suspicion?  Or is it sub-
ject to  the  usual  presumption  in  favor of individualized  suspi-
cion?39
And  even if we  could  know with  more  certainty when  the
"special  needs"  analysis  applies,  the  Chandler Court  leaves  the
"6  See Gisela  Ostwald,  Youth  No Bar to  Genetic Fingerprinting  in the U.S.,  DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR,  May 4,  1998 (explaining that 49 of the 50 states now allow the police
to store the DNA fingerprints of criminals); Peter Finn, Revolution Underway in Use of
DNA  Profiles; Bid to Link  U.S. Databanks is  Crime-Solving Edge, WASH.  POsT,  Nov.  16,
1997,  at B4  (noting  that Virginia  was  the  first state  to  create  a  DNA  databank  in
1989).
"  See,  e.g.,  Price  v. Johnston,  334  U.S.  266,  285  (1948)  ("Lawful  incarceration
brings about  the necessary  withdrawal  or limitation of many privileges  and rights,  a
retraction justified  by  the  considerations  underlying  our penal  system."),  quoted in
Bell v. Wolfish,  441  U.S. 520, 545-46  (1979)  (dealing in particular with  limitations on
inmates'  privacy rights).
"'  Circumstances that might favor the widespread  collection  of DNA information
under a "special needs" analysis might include, for example, the ability to collect such
information from a fingernail  clipping or a hair sample,  instead of by drawing blood
(given that these former methods would diminish the physical intrusiveness of the ex-
traction of the information), or the ability to shield from disclosure other, private in-
formation  (such  as susceptibility to certain  diseases)  encoded  in DNA  (which would
diminish the degree of intrusion into personal privacy).
,'9 The  same  questions could  be applied  to  other suspicionless  searches and  sei-
zures  made  possible  by new technology, such  as thermal imaging, widespread  video
surveillance, and  internet eavesdropping.  See generally Symposium:  Crime and Technol-
ogy,  10 HARv.J.L.  & TECH. 383  (1997).
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"special needs" balancing test as wide-open and free-wheeling as
possible.  How much danger must the government be seeking to
combat?  In the drug testing context, the Court approved both
the drug testing of railroad  employees4  (who obviously could
cause massive  property damage  and loss of life if under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol) and the drug testing of high school
athletes  (whose danger to others on the playing field seems less
in the way of a "surpassing safety interest").  What kind of proof
of a pre-existing  problem  must be  shown? 141  How unintrusive
must the  government's  conduct be?42   Of course,  one  of the
great virtues  of a balancing  analysis  is  to  eschew  rules  and  to
consider the unique circumstances  of each situation.  But one
of the great vices of a balancing analysis is its lack of predictabil-
ity, a lack that is particular dangerous in the context of law en-
forcement.' 4 3
This lack of predictability is reflective of the larger problem
inherent in both the  Chandler  and the  Hendricks opinions.  De-
spite the fact that the divisions on the Court as well as the iden-
tities of the opinion writers were quite different in the two cases,
both  majorities failed  in  strikingly similar  ways  to  see  the  dis-
crete  problems before  them as  related  to, indeed  emblematic
of, a larger discourse  that more and more urgently needs care-
ful engagement.  This failure may well be the result of an often
laudable cautiousness in decision-crafting, a self-conscious  effort
to narrow the focus to that and only that which must necessarily
be decided within a given case.  But it is also a virtue ofjudicial
craftsmanship,  particularly  at the  Supreme  Court level,  to  an-
ticipate the ways in which a particular decision will affect future
particular cases and legal  discourse more generally.  For better
40 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
"'  See supra text accompanying  note 129 (remarking that the Chandler  Court casti-
gates the State of Georgia for failing to  document a problem of drug-use  by govern-
ment officials while at the same time it notes that such documentation  is not always
necessary to survive a "special needs" analysis).
142 The taking of blood  approved  in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S.  602  (1989),  and the searching of homes  approved in  Griffin v. Wisconsin,  483
U.S. 868  (1987), are fairly serious intrusions into personal security.
"3  See Steiker,  Second  Thoughts, supra note  36, at 854-55  (arguing that a  "reason-
ableness" balancing test is dangerous in the law enforcement context because it fails
to adequately contain police discretion).
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or worse, the Court will not be able to avoid the implications for
and  questions about the limits of the preventive state  raised by
Hendricks and Chandler  for long.
IV.  THE FUTURE OF THE PREVENTWE STATE?
The central question that the Court must soon engage in a
concerted  fashion  is whether  and to what extent the state's  at-
tempt to prevent or prophylactically  deter (as opposed to inves-
tigate)  crime  and  to  incapacitate  or  treat  (as  opposed  to
punish) wrongdoers  insulates the state's actions from  the limits
the  law  would  otherwise  place  on  the  investigative/punitive
state.  The  Constitution  places  limits  on the  punitive  state be-
cause  of special  fears  about  state  abuse  both  of law  enforce-
ment's  monopoly  on  the  legitimate  use  of force  and  of  the
justice system's ability "to harness  the power of blame" through
criminal punishment.
4 4  These  fears  are  especially heightened
when the  state moves,  as it often does  in the criminal  context,
against  a discrete  and targeted  enemy.  Are  there  any special
justifications  that would  argue  for cabining  the  power  of the
preventive state?  If so, for cabining it in what respects?
I mean to raise rather than  to answer these  questions here.
But the  general sorts of concerns raised by the preventive  state
are not so  much focused  on the  possibility  of political  or  dis-
criminatory oppression of known enemies,  although preventive
institutions could surely be adapted  to such  ends.  (Think, for
example, of the use of the  mental institution for political dissi-
dents in the former Soviet Union.)  Rather, the biggest concern
raised by the growth of the preventive state is likely the fear of a
"Big Brother" state-a government even more deeply insinuated
into "private" life than it already is.  Preventive state actions like
the  incarceration  of the  dangerous  or the  implementation  of
suspicionless  searches  and seizures  give the state  much  greater
power  over  and  much  greater  knowledge  about  its  citizenry.
The  possibility  that  developing  technology  will  enhance  the
state's  ability  to collect  data  about  its  citizens and  to  conduct
'  See Steiker, Punishment and  Procedure,  supra  note 35, at 809.
806 [Vol.  88THE  PREVENTIVE STATE
surveillance of them in both real and "virtual" space makes such
concerns more credible and compelling.
On the other hand, the  state's enhanced  power  over and
knowledge about its citizens could have many beneficial  effects,
particularly in the reduction of crime, social disorder, and per-
sonal insecurity.  How much  does or should the state's benign
intentions in its use of such power or its pursuit of such knowl-
edge count in the constitutional  (or policy)  balance?  One an-
swer is the famous Brandeis quote  (offered by Justice Ginsburg
in striking down Georgia's suspicionless drug testing program):
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty  when  the  Government's  purposes  are  beneficent.  Men  born  to
freedom  are  naturally  alert  to repel  invasion  of their  liberty  by  evil-
minded  rulers.  The  greatest  dangers  to  liberty  lurk in  insidious  en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.'4e
Whether or not Brandeis'  answer is right or complete, we need
answers  to the questions  posed above.  Few courts or scholars
have offered such answers (or even recognized the questions). 146
It is time that more do so.
In that spirit, I offer this essay as a "Foreword" in three dis-
tinct senses.  It is, of course, an introduction to this issue of The
Journal  of Criminal  Law &  Criminology, an issue that offers a care-
ful and comprehensive  discussion  of the relevant  criminal law
decisions  of the Supreme Court's  1996 Term.  It is  also  a pre-
view of topics that I myself plan to continue thinking and writ-
ing  about  in  the  future.  And,  finally,  I  hope  that  it  is  a
"Foreword"  in  the  sense  of a forerunner  of other  words,  by
courts  and scholars  alike,  on  the important  questions-which
" Chandler  v.  Miller, 117  S.  Ct.  1295,  1305  (1997)  (citing  Olmstead  v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)  (BrandeisJ.)).
"6  There  are some exceptions:  a few scholars have begun to engage the question of
the relationship between the civil and criminal state, particularly in regard to the use
of preventive  incarceration.  See,  e.g.,  Paul H. Robinson,  Foreword: The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and Dangerous  Blameless Offenders, 83 J.  CraM. L. & CRIWNOLOGY  693  (1993)
(arguing in favor of the civil incarceration of the dangerous in order to preserve the
blaming function of the punitive  state for the blameworthy); Stephen J.  Schulhofer,
Two Systems of Social Protection:  Comments on the Civil-Criminal  Distinction, with Particular
Reference to Sexually Violent Predator  Laws, 7J. CONTEMP.  LEGAL ISSUES  69, 85  (1996)  (ar-
guing for limits on the civil incarceration  of the dangerous because "civil deprivation
of liberty is permissible only as a gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal process
cannot address").
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are  being  raised  today in  a  myriad  of contexts  and  guises-
about the limits of the preventive state.